offering a persuasive alternative, Weinstein simply displays the "emotivist self" so brilliantly dissected by MacIntyre.

It seems unlikely, moreover, that Weinstein can be correct in naming Augustine and Paul of Tarsus as his predecessors in challenging the understanding of virtue as that of a self-in-community. That the individual always transcends any historical community is certainly true for Augustine, but that truth creates tension, not Weinstein's "radical separation." And this self-transcendence must be balanced against Paul's language about the body of Christ as the context for the moral life. Indeed, Weinstein's project is finally best questioned by considering what Augustine might say about the claim that philosophical activity must strive to "observe. . . . life as a whole." To catch the heart and hold it still, to see the self whole and entire—this is impossible for Augustine. Only God can do that; hence, virtue requires that we simply confess what we are to the God who sees us whole.

Weinstein's discussions of the virtues of self-control, artistry, and love are not without their moments of interest, but the discussion is far more abstract than necessary, and the individualistic understanding of virtue is unlikely to persuade those concerned not just to be virtuous but to transmit virtue.

—GILBERT MEILAENDER

CONTRA HABERMAS *VIA* SCHELLING

Werner Marx: *The Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling: History, System, and Freedom.* Translated by Thomas Nenon. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984. Pp.144. $24.95.)

The Hegel renaissance in America has evidently begun to revive interest in some of the lesser-known figures of German Idealism as well, notably Fichte and Schelling. The latter's 200th birthday in 1974 offered the occasion for numerous "anniversary papers," some now available in convenient English language collections. Not long after, three major studies of Schelling's philosophy appeared in English, the most recent of which was Werner Marx's *The Philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling* (German Edition, 1977; American edition, 1984.)

Marx, an eminent scholar and director of the Husserl archives in Freiburg, has written on issues ranging across the entire tradition of continental philosophy from Aristotle to Heidegger. His work could probably be described as "phenomenological" in a loose sense; yet it is most notable for the extraordinary learning, patient textual analysis, and painstaking historical research that infuse it. Indeed, one of Marx's reasons for writing the present volume is to show how much contemporary philosophy still depends on elements derived from bygone metaphysical and religious world views. To put it bluntly, Marx is not very impressed by most modern philosophy which, he claims, has "not found any new categories" but instead tends to employ the traditional ones while simultaneously re-

nouncing "the intellectual resuppositions that provide the basis for these categories." Hence, he seeks to unmask old metaphysical systems decked out in new terminology so that we will not confuse these with truly original philosophizing, should such a thing ever again come to light.

The Schelling volume, dominated as it is by such complex philosophical controversies, does not suit the needs of beginning students of German Idealism, who might do better to turn to Alan White's *Schelling: An Introduction to the System of Freedom.* But for those with sufficient background, this slim volume yields a wealth of new interpretations and insights.

Three themes cut across the ostensible subject matter of its three essays. There is first of all the scholar's concern to reconstruct the context of Schelling's philosophy, especially its roots in teleology, mystical Christianity, and Spinozan metaphysics. Marx would insist that we simply cannot understand Schelling (as he understood himself) without recognizing, in his language and categories, the persistence of these traditional motifs.

Second, one discerns in all three essays a muted polemic against Juergen Habermas, erstwhile Frankfurt School theorist and perhaps contemporary Germany's most widely read and discussed philosopher. The first essay, which compares Schelling's and Habermas's respective conceptions of history, is meant to underscore Marx's general historical point: even such an apparently original thinker as Habermas has in fact constructed his theories out of the fragments of tradition. And because he tries to ignore or paper over certain difficulties inherent in that tradition, notably the dilemma of freedom versus necessity, Habermas's arguments inevitably betray "a certain inconsistency." These criticisms of Habermas seem also to support a further conclusion: the entire (Karl) Marxian project of transcending philosophy in favor of social critique and *praxis* breaks down as soon as one unearths the suppressed philosophical problems within it. One cannot "transcend" philosophy; one can only attempt to practice it in a way that is suited to our contemporary predicament.

The third theme that pervades these essays is a cautious, measured admiration for Schelling's own originality. Although Marx explicitly warns that Schelling's assumptions and outlook are no longer our own, he nevertheless suggests that Schelling has asked questions and pioneered approaches which philosophers dare not overlook. Most prominent among these are Schelling's attempt to ground philosophy in "intellectual intuition" and his struggle to square human moral freedom (as a choice of good and evil) with the traditionally ascribed freedom of God to order the universe according to His will.

In these and other instances, Marx carefully delimits the originality of Schelling's approach by contrasting it to Hegel's. His purpose is not to denigrate Hegel's achievement, but rather to remove Schelling's philosophy from the long shadow cast by his more famous contemporary. He wants us to see in Schelling's writings an *alternative* approach to fulfilling the fundamental "task of philosophy," defined jointly by Hegel and Schelling as overcoming "the traditional opposition such as reason and sensu-

ality, intelligence and nature . . . absolute subjectivity and absolute objectivity."

For Hegel, the path toward true philosophic insight, a grasp of the "whole" or the "absolute," leads finite consciousness through a series of one-sided and incomplete forms, each representing self-conceptions that prove, on examination, to be "untrue." Along this path (embodied in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*), progress could be made only by reflection upon the inadequacy of one's own categories to grasp and express the nature of experience as it presents itself. And in an important sense, progress toward a rational comprehension of the absolute coincides with a more and more adequate conception of the self.

In Schelling, by contrast, "intuition" rather than "reflection" represents the sole path to knowledge of the absolute and toward genuine self-knowledge (these two terms being likewise inextricably interwoven). But, as Marx shows, intuition is essentially "prereflective"; hence there can be no progressive self-discovery *cum* self-development of the absolute as in Hegel. There is in fact something "existential" in Schelling's notion of intellectual intuition; as Marx stresses: "the workings of reason are themselves preconscious—we become conscious of them only in their results. And this is the source of the pertinence and fascination of [Schelling's] attempt for us today as we seek more now than ever to understand the way in which our comprehension and action 'happen to us,' to understand their 'passivity.' " Hegelian self-knowledge is reflective, conceptual, and exoteric; Schellingian intellectual intuition involves a rare and difficult epiphany like insight into the very conditions of one's own being. In this respect, at least, we really are confronting two fundamentally different approaches to philosophy, and we would do Schelling a serious injustice to treat him as a mere way station of philosophical development toward Hegel.

In spite of its impressive scholarship and its broad implications for modern philosophy Marx's book merits only a qualified recommendation for political theorists. It is, as noted, a very challenging study even for the initiated. Moreover, it contains little in the way of explicit political or social philosophy, even though a determined reader will know how to draw the appropriate inferences, especially from the first essay on Habermas and Schelling.

But two other reservations carry more weight. First, the polemic against Habermas fails to convince. It depends on proving that Habermas holds to an implicitly teleological conception of history (*i.e.,* a notion of historical necessity) inconsistent with his doctrine of emancipation through self-reflection (*i.e.,* freedom). Marx believes he has located in Habermas's writings "unequivocal verification that Habermas's theory is 'teleological.' " But the evidence presented does not seem to me to justify this conclusion, nor the further inferences built upon it. Habermas's social-political ideals of "communication free from domination" and "mature responsibility" strike me as just what he says they are: ideals in the Kantian sense that we *should* strive to attain, but whose fulfillment is by no means necessarily guaranteed. Indeed, Habermas himself (for example, in the article "Technology and Science as Ideology") has expressly re-

pudiated the necessitarian elements in Karl Marx's theory, such as the inevitable radicalization of the proletariat, and has cast about hopefully for some new source of radical change, such as the student protest movement of the 1960's (see, for example, the piece on "Student Protest in the Federal Republic of Germany").

My second reservation concerns Marx's wish to rescue Schelling from oblivion or (perhaps a worse fate!) from being relegated to the status of "pre-Hegelian." It seems to me that, in fact, there are good reasons for leaving Schelling in relative obscurity while continuing to read Hegel with care. Even if one rejects the framework of Hegel's system, the idea of absolute knowledge, there still remains a wealth of highly suggestive, detailed studies concerning everything from lordship and bondage to poverty in civil society from which contemporary political philosophers can profit.

Schelling's work, on the other hand, is burdened by two highly problematic trains of thought that render it remote from contemporary concerns. To begin with, Schelling is perhaps most famous for his philosophy of nature, which incorporates various bogus theories and misunderstood "facts" into a composite picture of *natura naturans,* a divine nature manifesting itself in ever-higher "potencies." One must ask whether even Schelling himself would still want to support his own philosophical edifice if he could know how irrevocably modern science has destroyed its major load-bearing wall, the *Naturphilosophie.*

Second, as Marx shows in some detail, Schelling's conceptions of the self and of human freedom are set within a definite context, that of gnosticism, mysticism, and theosophy as these were practiced in the early nineteenth century. While such notions are not simply false, like those of Schelling's philosophy of nature, they certainly exercise far less influence today than they once did. To the extent that Schelling's most important philosophical arguments depend on such mystical-gnostic assumptions, the scope of their appeal will inevitably be narrowed down to just the "true believers," rather than the wider circle of those who treat philosophy as a discipline of rational argument and persuasion.

After reading Marx's deft and convincing interpretations of Schelling, the reader is still left wondering what, in the work of this "last Idealist," is really living and what is dead. To what extent can the still-vital aspects of Schelling's philosophy be extricated from the moribund shell? I, for one, hope that Werner Marx will try to answer this question in his future writings.

—LEWIS P. HINCHMAN

IS CONSTANT'S LIBERALISM "ANTIDEMOCRATIC"?

Stephen Holmes: *Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984. Pp. 261. $27.50.)

Stephen Holmes has offered a sensitive and intelligent corrective to